draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-07.txt		draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-latest.txt
	HTTPAuth Working Group J. Reschke		HTTPAuth Working Group J. Reschke
	Internet-Draft greenbytes		Internet-Draft greenbytes
	Obsoletes: 2617 (if approved) February 28, 2015		Obsoletes: 2617 (if approved) April 10, 2024
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: September 1, 2015		Expires: October 12, 2024
	The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme		The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme
	draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-07		draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-latest
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)		This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
	Authentication Scheme, which transmits credentials as user-id/		authentication scheme, which transmits credentials as user-id/
	password pairs, encoded using Base64.		password pairs, encoded using Base64.
	Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor before publication)		Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
	Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPAuth working group		Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPAuth working group
	mailing list (http-auth@ietf.org), which is archived at <http://		mailing list (http-auth@ietf.org), which is archived at
	www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-auth/current/maillist.html>.		<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-auth/current/
			maillist.html>.
	XML versions, latest edits and the issues list for this document are		XML versions, latest edits and the issues list for this document are
	available from <http://greenbytes.de/tech/		available from <http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/#draft-ietf-
	webdav/#draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update>.		httpauth-basicauth-update>.
	The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix C.8.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2024.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF		This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
	Contributions published or made publicly available before November		Contributions published or made publicly available before November
	10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this		10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
	skipping to change at page 3, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 34 ¶
	modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.		modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
	Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling		Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
	the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified		the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
	outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may		outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
	not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format		not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
	it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other		it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
	than English.		than English.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.1. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. The 'Basic' Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. The 'Basic' Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. The 'charset' auth-param . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.1. The 'charset' auth-param . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.2. Re-using Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		2.2. Reusing Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Appendix B. Deployment Considerations for the 'charset'		Appendix B. Deployment Considerations for the 'charset'
	Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	B.1. User Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		B.1. User Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	B.2. Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		B.2. Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	B.3. Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8? . . . 14		B.3. Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8? . . 14
	Appendix C. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	C.1. Since RFC 2617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	C.2. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-00 . . . . . . 14
	C.3. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-01 . . . . . . 15
	C.4. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02 . . . . . . 15
	C.5. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-03 . . . . . . 15
	C.6. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-04 . . . . . . 15
	C.7. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-05 . . . . . . 15
	C.8. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-06 . . . . . . 15
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)		This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
	Authentication Scheme, which transmits credentials as user-id/		authentication scheme, which transmits credentials as user-id/
	password pairs, encoded using Base64 (HTTP authentication schemes are		password pairs, encoded using Base64 (HTTP authentication schemes are
	defined in [RFC7235]).		defined in [RFC7235]).
	This scheme is not considered to be a secure method of user		This scheme is not considered to be a secure method of user
	authentication unless used in conjunction with some external secure		authentication unless used in conjunction with some external secure
	system such as TLS (Transport Layer Security, [RFC5246]), as the		system such as TLS (Transport Layer Security, [RFC5246]), as the
	user-id and password are passed over the network as cleartext.		user-id and password are passed over the network as cleartext.
	The "Basic" scheme previously was defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617].		The "Basic" scheme previously was defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617].
	This document updates the definition, and also addresses		This document updates the definition, and also addresses
	internationalization issues by introducing the "charset"		internationalization issues by introducing the 'charset'
	authentication parameter (Section 2.1).		authentication parameter (Section 2.1).
	Other documents updating RFC 2617 are "Hypertext Transfer Protocol		Other documents updating RFC 2617 are "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
	(HTTP/1.1): Authentication" ([RFC7235], defining the authentication		(HTTP/1.1): Authentication" ([RFC7235], defining the authentication
	framework), "HTTP Digest Access Authentication" ([DIGEST], updating		framework), "HTTP Digest Access Authentication" ([RFC7616], updating
	the definition of the "Digest" authentication scheme), and "The		the definition of the "Digest" authentication scheme), and "HTTP
	Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication-Info and Proxy-		Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info Response Header
	Authentication-Info Response Header Fields" ([AUTHINFO]). Taken		Fields" ([RFC7615]). Taken together, these four documents obsolete
	together, these four documents obsolete RFC 2617.		RFC 2617.
	1.1. Terminology and Notation		1.1. Terminology and Notation
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	The terms "protection space" and "realm" are defined in Section 2.2		The terms ""protection space"" and ""realm"" are defined in
	of [RFC7235].		Section 2.2 of [RFC7235].
	The terms (character) "repertoire" and "character encoding scheme"		The terms ""(character) repertoire"" and ""character encoding
	are defined in Section 2 of [RFC6365].		scheme"" are defined in Section 2 of [RFC6365].
	2. The 'Basic' Authentication Scheme		2. The 'Basic' Authentication Scheme
	The "Basic" authentication scheme is based on the model that the		The Basic authentication scheme is based on the model that the client
	client needs to authenticate itself with a user-id and a password for		needs to authenticate itself with a user-id and a password for each
	each protection space ("realm"). The realm value is a free-form		protection space ("realm"). The realm value is a free-form string
	string which can only be compared for equality with other realms on		that can only be compared for equality with other realms on that
	that server. The server will service the request only if it can		server. The server will service the request only if it can validate
	validate the user-id and password for the protection space applying		the user-id and password for the protection space applying to the
	to the requested resource.		requested resource.
	The "Basic" authentication scheme utilizes the Authentication		The Basic authentication scheme utilizes the Authentication Framework
	Framework as follows:		as follows.
	In challenges:		In challenges:
	o the scheme name is "Basic"		o The scheme name is "Basic".
	o the authentication parameter "realm" is REQUIRED ([RFC7235],		o The authentication parameter 'realm' is REQUIRED ([RFC7235],
	Section 2.2)		Section 2.2).
	o the authentication parameter "charset" is OPTIONAL (see		o The authentication parameter 'charset' is OPTIONAL (see
	Section 2.1)		Section 2.1).
	o no other authentication parameters are defined -- unknown		o No other authentication parameters are defined -- unknown
	parameters MUST be ignored by recipients, and new parameters can		parameters MUST be ignored by recipients, and new parameters can
	only be defined by revising this specification		only be defined by revising this specification.
	See also Section 4.1 of [RFC7235] which discusses the complexity of		See also Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], which discusses the complexity of
	parsing challenges properly.		parsing challenges properly.
	Note that both scheme and parameter names are matched case-		Note that both scheme and parameter names are matched case-
	insensitively.		insensitively.
	For credentials, the "token68" syntax defined in Section 2.1 of		For credentials, the "token68" syntax defined in Section 2.1 of
	[RFC7235] is used. The value is computed based on user-id and		[RFC7235] is used. The value is computed based on user-id and
	password as defined below.		password as defined below.
	Upon receipt of a request for a URI within the protection space that		Upon receipt of a request for a URI within the protection space that
	lacks credentials, the server can reply with a challenge using the		lacks credentials, the server can reply with a challenge using the
	401 (Unauthorized) status code ([RFC7235], Section 3.1) and the WWW-		401 (Unauthorized) status code ([RFC7235], Section 3.1) and the WWW-
	Authenticate header field ([RFC7235], Section 4.1).		Authenticate header field ([RFC7235], Section 4.1).
	For instance:		For instance:
	HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized		HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
	Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2014 16:50:53 GMT		Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2014 16:50:53 GMT
	WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="WallyWorld"		WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="WallyWorld"
	...where "WallyWorld" is the string assigned by the server to		where "WallyWorld" is the string assigned by the server to identify
	identify the protection space.		the protection space.
	A proxy can respond with a similar challenge using the 407 (Proxy		A proxy can respond with a similar challenge using the 407 (Proxy
	Authentication Required) status code ([RFC7235], Section 3.2) and the		Authentication Required) status code ([RFC7235], Section 3.2) and the
	Proxy-Authenticate header field ([RFC7235], Section 4.3).		Proxy-Authenticate header field ([RFC7235], Section 4.3).
	To receive authorization, the client		To receive authorization, the client
	1. obtains the user-id and password from the user,		1. obtains the user-id and password from the user,
	2. constructs the user-pass by concatenating the user-id, a single		2. constructs the user-pass by concatenating the user-id, a single
	colon (":") character, and the password,		colon (":") character, and the password,
	3. encodes the user-pass into an octet sequence (see below for a		3. encodes the user-pass into an octet sequence (see below for a
	discussion of character encoding schemes),		discussion of character encoding schemes),
	4. and obtains the basic-credentials by encoding this octet sequence		4. and obtains the basic-credentials by encoding this octet sequence
	using base64 ([RFC4648], Section 4) into a sequence of US-ASCII		using Base64 ([RFC4648], Section 4) into a sequence of US-ASCII
	characters ([RFC0020]).		characters ([RFC0020]).
	The original definition of this authentication scheme failed to		The original definition of this authentication scheme failed to
	specify the character encoding scheme used to convert the user-pass		specify the character encoding scheme used to convert the user-pass
	into an octet sequence. In practice, most implementations chose		into an octet sequence. In practice, most implementations chose
	either a locale-specific encoding such as ISO-8859-1 ([ISO-8859-1]),		either a locale-specific encoding such as ISO-8859-1 ([ISO-8859-1]),
	or UTF-8 ([RFC3629]). For backwards compatibility reasons, this		or UTF-8 ([RFC3629]). For backwards compatibility reasons, this
	specification continues to leave the default encoding undefined, as		specification continues to leave the default encoding undefined, as
	long as it is compatible with US-ASCII (mapping any US-ASCII		long as it is compatible with US-ASCII (mapping any US-ASCII
	character to a single octet matching the US-ASCII character code).		character to a single octet matching the US-ASCII character code).
	skipping to change at page 6, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 44 ¶
	that user-ids supplied by users do not contain colons; recipients		that user-ids supplied by users do not contain colons; recipients
	will then treat part of the username input as part of the password.		will then treat part of the username input as part of the password.
	If the user agent wishes to send the user-id "Aladdin" and password		If the user agent wishes to send the user-id "Aladdin" and password
	"open sesame", it would use the following header field:		"open sesame", it would use the following header field:
	Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==		Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==
	2.1. The 'charset' auth-param		2.1. The 'charset' auth-param
	In challenges, servers can use the "charset" authentication parameter		In challenges, servers can use the 'charset' authentication parameter
	to indicate the character encoding scheme they expect the user agent		to indicate the character encoding scheme they expect the user agent
	to use when generating "user-pass" (a sequence of octets). This		to use when generating "user-pass" (a sequence of octets). This
	information is purely advisory.		information is purely advisory.
	The only allowed value is "UTF-8", to be matched case-insensitively		The only allowed value is "UTF-8"; it is to be matched case-
	(see [RFC2978], Section 2.3). It indicates that the server expects		insensitively (see [RFC2978], Section 2.3). It indicates that the
	character data to be converted to Unicode Normalization Form C		server expects character data to be converted to Unicode
	("NFC", see Section 3 of [RFC5198]) and to be encoded into octets		Normalization Form C ("NFC"; see Section 3 of [RFC5198]) and to be
	using the UTF-8 character encoding scheme ([RFC3629]).		encoded into octets using the UTF-8 character encoding scheme
			([RFC3629]).
	For the user-id, recipients MUST support all characters defined in		For the user-id, recipients MUST support all characters defined in
	the "UsernameCasePreserved" profile defined in in Section 3.3 of		the "UsernameCasePreserved" profile defined in Section 3.3 of
	[PRECIS], with the exception of the colon (":") character.		[RFC7613], with the exception of the colon (":") character.
	For the password, recipients MUST support all characters defined in		For the password, recipients MUST support all characters defined in
	the "OpaqueString" profile defined in in Section 4.2 of [PRECIS].		the "OpaqueString" profile defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC7613].
	Other values are reserved for future use.		Other values are reserved for future use.
	Note: The 'charset' is only defined on challenges, as "Basic" uses		Note: The 'charset' is only defined on challenges, as Basic
	a single token for credentials ('token68' syntax); thus the		authentication uses a single token for credentials ('token68'
	credentials syntax isn't extensible.		syntax); thus, the credentials syntax isn't extensible.
	Note: The name 'charset' has been chosen for consistency with		Note: The name 'charset' has been chosen for consistency with
	Section 2.1.1 of [RFC2831]. A better name would have been		Section 2.1.1 of [RFC2831]. A better name would have been
	'accept-charset', as it is not about the message it appears in,		'accept-charset', as it is not about the message it appears in,
	but the server's expectation.		but the server's expectation.
	In the example below, the server prompts for authentication in the		In the example below, the server prompts for authentication in the
	"foo" realm, using Basic authentication, with a preference for the		"foo" realm, using Basic authentication, with a preference for the
	UTF-8 character encoding scheme:		UTF-8 character encoding scheme:
	WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="foo", charset="UTF-8"		WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="foo", charset="UTF-8"
	Note that the parameter value can be either a token or a quoted		Note that the parameter value can be either a token or a quoted
	string; in this case the server chose to use the quoted-string		string; in this case, the server chose to use the quoted-string
	notation.		notation.
	The user's name is "test", and the password is the string "123"		The user's name is "test", and the password is the string "123"
	followed by the Unicode character U+00A3 (POUND SIGN). Using the		followed by the Unicode character U+00A3 (POUND SIGN). Using the
	character encoding scheme UTF-8, the user-pass becomes:		character encoding scheme UTF-8, the user-pass becomes:
	't' 'e' 's' 't' ':' '1' '2' '3' pound		't' 'e' 's' 't' ':' '1' '2' '3' pound
	74 65 73 74 3A 31 32 33 C2 A3		74 65 73 74 3A 31 32 33 C2 A3
	Encoding this octet sequence in Base64 ([RFC4648], Section 4) yields:		Encoding this octet sequence in Base64 ([RFC4648], Section 4) yields:
	dGVzdDoxMjPCow==		dGVzdDoxMjPCow==
	Thus the Authorization header field would be:		Thus, the Authorization header field would be:
	Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==		Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==
	Or, for proxy authentication:		Or, for proxy authentication:
	Proxy-Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==		Proxy-Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==
	2.2. Re-using Credentials		2.2. Reusing Credentials
	Given the absolute URI ([RFC3986], Section 4.3) of an authenticated		Given the absolute URI ([RFC3986], Section 4.3) of an authenticated
	request, the "authentication scope" of that request is obtained by		request, the "authentication scope" of that request is obtained by
	removing all characters after the last slash ("/") character of the		removing all characters after the last slash ("/") character of the
	path component ("hier_part", see [RFC3986], Section 3). A client		path component ("hier_part"; see [RFC3986], Section 3). A client
	SHOULD assume that resources identified by URIs with a prefix-match		SHOULD assume that resources identified by URIs with a prefix-match
	of the authentication scope are also within the protection space		of the authentication scope are also within the protection space
	specified by the realm value of that authenticated request.		specified by the realm value of that authenticated request.
	A client MAY preemptively send the corresponding Authorization header		A client MAY preemptively send the corresponding Authorization header
	field with requests for resources in that space without receipt of		field with requests for resources in that space without receipt of
	another challenge from the server. Similarly, when a client sends a		another challenge from the server. Similarly, when a client sends a
	request to a proxy, it MAY reuse a user-id and password in the Proxy-		request to a proxy, it MAY reuse a user-id and password in the Proxy-
	Authorization header field without receiving another challenge from		Authorization header field without receiving another challenge from
	the proxy server.		the proxy server.
	For example, given an authenticated request to:		For example, given an authenticated request to:
	http://example.com/docs/index.html		http://example.com/docs/index.html
	...requests to the URIs below could use the known credentials:		requests to the URIs below could use the known credentials:
	http://example.com/docs/		http://example.com/docs/
	http://example.com/docs/test.doc		http://example.com/docs/test.doc
	http://example.com/docs/?page=1		http://example.com/docs/?page=1
	...while the URIs		while the URIs
	http://example.com/other/		http://example.com/other/
	https://example.com/docs/		https://example.com/docs/
	would be considered to be outside the authentication scope.		would be considered to be outside the authentication scope.
	Note that a URI can be part of multiple authentication scopes (such		Note that a URI can be part of multiple authentication scopes (such
	as "http://example.com/" and "http://example.com/docs/"). This		as "http://example.com/" and "http://example.com/docs/"). This
	specification does not define which of these should be treated with		specification does not define which of these should be treated with
	higher priority.		higher priority.
	3. Internationalization Considerations		3. Internationalization Considerations
	User-ids or passwords containing characters outside the US-ASCII		User-ids or passwords containing characters outside the US-ASCII
	character repertoire will cause interoperability issues, unless both		character repertoire will cause interoperability issues, unless both
	communication partners agree on what character encoding scheme is to		communication partners agree on what character encoding scheme is to
	be used. Servers can use the new 'charset' parameter (Section 2.1)		be used. Servers can use the new 'charset' parameter (Section 2.1)
	to indicate a preference of "UTF-8", increasing the probability that		to indicate a preference of "UTF-8", increasing the probability that
	clients will switch to that encoding.		clients will switch to that encoding.
	The "realm" parameter carries data that can be considered textual,		The 'realm' parameter carries data that can be considered textual;
	however [RFC7235] does not define a way to reliably transport non-US-		however, [RFC7235] does not define a way to reliably transport non-
	ASCII characters. This is a known issue that would need to be		US-ASCII characters. This is a known issue that would need to be
	addressed in a revision to that specification.		addressed in a revision to that specification.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	The Basic authentication scheme is not a secure method of user		The Basic authentication scheme is not a secure method of user
	authentication, nor does it in any way protect the entity, which is		authentication, nor does it in any way protect the entity, which is
	transmitted in cleartext across the physical network used as the		transmitted in cleartext across the physical network used as the
	carrier. HTTP does not prevent the addition of enhancements (such as		carrier. HTTP does not prevent the addition of enhancements (such as
	schemes to use one-time passwords) to Basic authentication.		schemes to use one-time passwords) to Basic authentication.
	The most serious flaw in Basic authentication is that it results in		The most serious flaw of Basic authentication is that it results in
	the cleartext transmission of the user's password over the physical		the cleartext transmission of the user's password over the physical
	network. Many other authentication schemes address this problem.		network. Many other authentication schemes address this problem.
	Because Basic authentication involves the cleartext transmission of		Because Basic authentication involves the cleartext transmission of
	passwords it SHOULD NOT be used (without enhancements such as HTTPS		passwords, it SHOULD NOT be used (without enhancements such as HTTPS
	[RFC2818]) to protect sensitive or valuable information.		[RFC2818]) to protect sensitive or valuable information.
	A common use of Basic authentication is for identification purposes		A common use of Basic authentication is for identification purposes
	-- requiring the user to provide a user-id and password as a means of		-- requiring the user to provide a user-id and password as a means of
	identification, for example, for purposes of gathering accurate usage		identification, for example, for purposes of gathering accurate usage
	statistics on a server. When used in this way it is tempting to		statistics on a server. When used in this way it is tempting to
	think that there is no danger in its use if illicit access to the		think that there is no danger in its use if illicit access to the
	protected documents is not a major concern. This is only correct if		protected documents is not a major concern. This is only correct if
	the server issues both user-id and password to the users and in		the server issues both user-id and password to the users and, in
	particular does not allow the user to choose his or her own password.		particular, does not allow the user to choose his or her own
	The danger arises because naive users frequently reuse a single		password. The danger arises because naive users frequently reuse a
	password to avoid the task of maintaining multiple passwords.		single password to avoid the task of maintaining multiple passwords.
	If a server permits users to select their own passwords, then the		If a server permits users to select their own passwords, then the
	threat is not only unauthorized access to documents on the server but		threat is not only unauthorized access to documents on the server but
	also unauthorized access to any other resources on other systems that		also unauthorized access to any other resources on other systems that
	the user protects with the same password. Furthermore, in the		the user protects with the same password. Furthermore, in the
	server's password database, many of the passwords may also be users'		server's password database, many of the passwords may also be users'
	passwords for other sites. The owner or administrator of such a		passwords for other sites. The owner or administrator of such a
	system could therefore expose all users of the system to the risk of		system could therefore expose all users of the system to the risk of
	unauthorized access to all those other sites if this information is		unauthorized access to all those other sites if this information is
	not maintained in a secure fashion. This raises both security and		not maintained in a secure fashion. This raises both security and
	privacy concerns ([RFC6973]). If the same user-id and password		privacy concerns ([RFC6973]). If the same user-id and password
	combination is in use to access other accounts, such as an email or		combination is in use to access other accounts, such as an email or
	health portal account, personal information could be exposed.		health portal account, personal information could be exposed.
	Basic authentication is also vulnerable to spoofing by counterfeit		Basic authentication is also vulnerable to spoofing by counterfeit
	servers. If a user can be led to believe that she is connecting to a		servers. If a user can be led to believe that she is connecting to a
	host containing information protected by Basic authentication when,		host containing information protected by Basic authentication when,
	in fact, she is connecting to a hostile server or gateway, then the		in fact, she is connecting to a hostile server or gateway, then the
	attacker can request a password, store it for later use, and feign an		attacker can request a password, store it for later use, and feign an
	error. Server implementers ought to guard against this sort of		error. Server implementers ought to guard against this sort of
	counterfeiting; in particular, software components which can take		counterfeiting; in particular, software components that can take over
	over control over the message framing on an existing connection (for		control over the message framing on an existing connection need to be
	instance, "NPH" ("non parsing of headers") scripts) need to be used		used carefully or not at all (for instance: NPH ("Non-Parsed Header")
	carefully or not at all.		scripts as described in Section 5 of [RFC3875]).
	Servers and proxies implementing Basic Authentication need to store		Servers and proxies implementing Basic authentication need to store
	user passwords in some form in order to authenticate a request.		user passwords in some form in order to authenticate a request.
	These passwords ought to be be stored in such a way that a leak of		These passwords ought to be stored in such a way that a leak of the
	the password data doesn't make them trivially recoverable. This is		password data doesn't make them trivially recoverable. This is
	especially important when users are allowed to set their own		especially important when users are allowed to set their own
	passwords, since users are known to choose weak passwords and to		passwords, since users are known to choose weak passwords and to
	reuse them across authentication realms. While a full discussion of		reuse them across authentication realms. While a full discussion of
	good password hashing techniques is beyond the scope of this		good password hashing techniques is beyond the scope of this
	document, server operators ought to make an effort to minimize risks		document, server operators ought to make an effort to minimize risks
	to their users in the event of a password data leak. For example,		to their users in the event of a password data leak. For example,
	servers ought to avoid storing user passwords in plaintext or as		servers ought to avoid storing user passwords in plaintext or as
	unsalted digests. For more discussion about modern password hashing		unsalted digests. For more discussion about modern password hashing
	techniques, see the "Password Hashing Competition"		techniques, see the "Password Hashing Competition"
	(<https://password-hashing.net>).		(<https://password-hashing.net>).
	The use of the UTF-8 character encoding scheme and of normalization		The use of the UTF-8 character encoding scheme and of normalization
	introduces additional security considerations; see Section 10 of		introduces additional security considerations; see Section 10 of
	[RFC3629] and Section 6 of [RFC5198] for more information.		[RFC3629] and Section 6 of [RFC5198] for more information.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	IANA maintains the registry of HTTP Authentication Schemes		IANA maintains the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication
	([RFC7235]) at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.		Scheme Registry" ([RFC7235]) at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/
			http-authschemes>.
	The entry for the "Basic" Authentication Scheme shall be updated by
	replacing the reference with a pointer to this specification.
	6. Acknowledgements
	This specification takes over the definition of the "Basic" HTTP
	Authentication Scheme, previously defined in RFC 2617. We thank John
	Franks, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker, Jeffery L. Hostetler, Scott D.
	Lawrence, Paul J. Leach, Ari Luotonen, and Lawrence C. Stewart for
	their work on that specification, from which significant amounts of
	text were borrowed. See Section 6 of [RFC2617] for further
	acknowledgements.
	The internationalization problem with respect to the character		The entry for the "Basic" authentication scheme has been updated to
	encoding scheme used for user-pass was reported as a Mozilla bug back		reference this specification.
	in the year 2000 (see
	<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41489> and also the
	more recent <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=656213>).
	It was Andrew Clover's idea to address it using a new auth-param.
	We also thank the members of the HTTPAuth Working Group and other		6. References
	reviewers, namely Stephen Farrell, Roy Fielding, Bjoern Hoehrmann,
	Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Tony Hansen, Kari Hurtta, Amos Jeffries,
	Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Koeller, Eric Lawrence, Barry Leiba, James
	Manger, Alexey Melnikov, Kathleen Moriarty, Juergen Schoenwaelder,
	Yaron Sheffer, Meral Shirazipour, Michael Sweet, and Martin Thomson
	for feedback on this revision.
	7. References		6.1. Normative References
	7.1. Normative References		[RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
			RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
	[PRECIS] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation,		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	Strings Representing Usernames and Passwords",		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-13 (work in progress),		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	December 2014.
	[RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange",		[RFC2978] Freed, N. and J. Postel, "IANA Charset Registration
	RFC 20, October 1969.		Procedures", BCP 19, RFC 2978, DOI 10.17487/RFC2978,
			October 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2978>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
			2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
	[RFC2978] Freed, N. and J. Postel, "IANA Charset Registration		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Procedures", BCP 19, RFC 2978, October 2000.		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
			RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.		Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,		[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
	"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax",		Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
	STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
	[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data		[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
	Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.		Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
	[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for		[RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
	Network Interchange", RFC 5198, March 2008.		Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.
	[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for		[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
	Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,		Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
	January 2008.		DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
	[RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in		[RFC7613] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation,
	Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,		Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings
	September 2011.		Representing Usernames and Passwords", RFC 7613,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC7613, August 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7613>.
	[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext		6.2. Informative References
	Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication",
	RFC 7235, June 2014.
	7.2. Informative References		[ISO-8859-1]
			International Organization for Standardization,
			"Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic
			character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1", ISO/
			IEC 8859-1:1998, 1998.
	[AUTHINFO] Reschke, J., "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)		[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
	Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info		Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
	Response Header Fields",		Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
	draft-ietf-httpbis-auth-info-02 (work in progress),		RFC 2617, DOI 10.17487/RFC2617, June 1999,
	February 2015.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2617>.
	[DIGEST] Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP		[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
	Digest Access Authentication",		DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
	draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-14 (work in progress),		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
	February 2015.
	[ISO-8859-1] International Organization for Standardization,		[RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a
	"Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded		SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, DOI 10.17487/RFC2831, May 2000,
	graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2831>.
	1", ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998, 1998.
	[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence,		[RFC3875] Robinson, D. and K. Coar, "The Common Gateway Interface
	S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP		(CGI) Version 1.1", RFC 3875, October 2004,
	Authentication: Basic and Digest Access		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3875>.
	Authentication", RFC 2617, June 1999.
	[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
			(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
	[RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication		[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
	as a SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000.		Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
			Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer		[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
	Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,		Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
	August 2008.		DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
	[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,		[RFC7615] Reschke, J., "HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy-
	Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy		Authentication-Info Response Header Fields", RFC 7615,
	Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7615, September 2015,
	July 2013.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7615>.
	[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext		[RFC7616] Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP
	Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",		Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616,
	RFC 7231, June 2014.		DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, September 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616>.
	Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2617		Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2617
	The scheme definition has been rewritten to be consistent with newer		The scheme definition has been rewritten to be consistent with newer
	specifications such as [RFC7235].		specifications such as [RFC7235].
	The new authentication parameter "charset" has been added. It is		The new authentication parameter 'charset' has been added. It is
	purely advisory, so existing implementations do not need to change,		purely advisory, so existing implementations do not need to change,
	unless they want to take advantage of the additional information		unless they want to take advantage of the additional information that
	which previously wasn't available.		previously wasn't available.
	Appendix B. Deployment Considerations for the 'charset' Parameter		Appendix B. Deployment Considerations for the 'charset' Parameter
	B.1. User Agents		B.1. User Agents
	User agents not implementing 'charset' will continue to work as		User agents not implementing 'charset' will continue to work as
	before, ignoring the new parameter.		before, ignoring the new parameter.
	User agents which already default to the UTF-8 encoding implement		User agents that already default to the UTF-8 encoding implement
	'charset' by definition.		'charset' by definition.
	Other user agents can keep their default behavior, and switch to		Other user agents can keep their default behavior and switch to UTF-8
	UTF-8 when seeing the new parameter.		when seeing the new parameter.
	B.2. Servers		B.2. Servers
	Servers that do not support non-US-ASCII characters in credentials do		Servers that do not support non-US-ASCII characters in credentials do
	not require any changes to support 'charset'.		not require any changes to support 'charset'.
	Servers that need to support non-US-ASCII characters, but cannot use		Servers that need to support non-US-ASCII characters, but cannot use
	the UTF-8 character encoding scheme will not be affected; they will		the UTF-8 character encoding scheme will not be affected; they will
	continue to function as well or as badly as before.		continue to function as well or as badly as before.
	Finally, servers that need to support non-US-ASCII characters and can		Finally, servers that need to support non-US-ASCII characters and can
	use the UTF-8 character encoding scheme can opt in by specifying the		use the UTF-8 character encoding scheme can opt in by specifying the
	charset parameter in the authentication challenge. Clients that do		'charset' parameter in the authentication challenge. Clients that do
	understand the charset parameter will then start to use UTF-8, while		understand the 'charset' parameter will then start to use UTF-8,
	other clients will continue to send credentials in their default		while other clients will continue to send credentials in their
	encoding, broken credentials, or no credentials at all. Until all		default encoding, broken credentials, or no credentials at all.
	clients are upgraded to support UTF-8, servers are likely to see both		Until all clients are upgraded to support UTF-8, servers are likely
	UTF-8 and "legacy" encodings in requests. When processing as UTF-8		to see both UTF-8 and "legacy" encodings in requests. When
	fails (due to a failure to decode as UTF-8 or a mismatch of user-id/		processing as UTF-8 fails (due to a failure to decode as UTF-8 or a
	password), a server might try a fallback to the previously supported		mismatch of user-id/password), a server might try a fallback to the
	legacy encoding in order to accomodate these legacy clients. Note		previously supported legacy encoding in order to accommodate these
	that implicit retries need to be done carefully; for instance, some		legacy clients. Note that implicit retries need to be done
	subsystems might detect repeated login failures and treat them as		carefully; for instance, some subsystems might detect repeated login
	potential credentials guessing attack.		failures and treat them as a potential credentials-guessing attack.
	B.3. Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8?		B.3. Why not simply switch the default encoding to UTF-8?
	There are sites in use today that default to a local character		There are sites in use today that default to a local character
	encoding scheme, such as ISO-8859-1 ([ISO-8859-1]), and expect user		encoding scheme, such as ISO-8859-1 ([ISO-8859-1]), and expect user
	agents to use that encoding. Authentication on these sites will stop		agents to use that encoding. Authentication on these sites will stop
	working if the user agent switches to a different encoding, such as		working if the user agent switches to a different encoding, such as
	UTF-8.		UTF-8.
	Note that sites might even inspect the User-Agent header field		Note that sites might even inspect the User-Agent header field
	([RFC7231], Section 5.5.3) to decide which character encoding scheme		([RFC7231], Section 5.5.3) to decide which character encoding scheme
	to expect from the client. Therefore they might support UTF-8 for		to expect from the client. Therefore, they might support UTF-8 for
	some user agents, but default to something else for others. User		some user agents, but default to something else for others. User
	agents in the latter group will have to continue to do what they do		agents in the latter group will have to continue to do what they do
	today until the majority of these servers have been upgraded to		today until the majority of these servers have been upgraded to
	always use UTF-8.		always use UTF-8.
	Appendix C. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)		Acknowledgements
	C.1. Since RFC 2617
	This draft acts as a baseline for tracking subsequent changes to the
	specification. As such, it extracts the definition of "Basic", plus
	the related Security Considerations, and also adds the IANA
	registration of the scheme. Changes to the actual definition will be
	made in subsequent drafts.
	C.2. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-00
	Fixed Base64 reference to point to an actual definition of Base64.
	Update HTTPbis and Digest references.
	Note that this spec, together with HTTPbis P7 and the Digest update,
	obsoletes RFC 2617.
	Rewrote text about authentication parameters and their extensibility.
	Pulled in the definition of the "charset" parameter.
	Removed a misleading statement about user-ids potentially being case-
	sensitive, as the same is true for passwords.
	Added TODOs with respect to path matching, and colons in user-ids.
	C.3. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-01
	Minor improvements on Security Considerations.
	Update Digest reference.
	Rewrite scheme definition as algorithm rather than pseudo-ABNF.
	Add a note about colons in user-id.
	Attempt to explain authentication scopes.
	C.4. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02
	Reference draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis for the set of characters
	that need to be supported in user-ids and passwords.
	C.5. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-03
	Update reference for draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis (which renames
	"Password" to "OpaqueString").
	Mention HTTPS as enhancement for securing the transmission of
	credentials.
	Update DIGEST reference and change it to informative.
	Use RFC 20 as reference for ASCII.
	C.6. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-04
	Fixed definition of authentication scope. Updated DIGEST reference.
	C.7. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-05
	Updated DIGEST and PRECIS references.
	Avoid the term "obfuscated". Say "free-form string" instead of
	"opaque string" in realm description.
	Mention AUTHINFO as yet another draft that helps obsoleting RFC 2617.
	Add a note about the complexity of parsing challenges correctly.
	C.8. Since draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-06
	Clarify IANA action.
	Remove leftover statement about use of ABNF (which was changed in
	-02).
	Security considerations: mention normalization and password storage.
	Rewrite advice on counterfeiting attacks.
	Update DIGEST reference.		This specification takes over the definition of the "Basic" HTTP
			Authentication Scheme, previously defined in RFC 2617. We thank John
			Franks, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker, Jeffery L. Hostetler, Scott D.
			Lawrence, Paul J. Leach, Ari Luotonen, and Lawrence C. Stewart for
			their work on that specification, from which significant amounts of
			text were borrowed. See Section 6 of [RFC2617] for further
			acknowledgements.
	Rewrite text about colons in user-id.		The internationalization problem with respect to the character
			encoding scheme used for user-pass was reported as a Mozilla bug back
			in the year 2000 (see <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/
			show_bug.cgi?id=41489> and also the more recent
			<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=656213>). It was
			Andrew Clover's idea to address it using a new auth-param.
	Expand deployment guidance.		We also thank the members of the HTTPAUTH Working Group and other
			reviewers, namely, Stephen Farrell, Roy Fielding, Daniel Kahn
			Gillmor, Tony Hansen, Bjoern Hoehrmann, Kari Hurtta, Amos Jeffries,
			Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Koeller, Eric Lawrence, Barry Leiba, James
			Manger, Alexey Melnikov, Kathleen Moriarty, Juergen Schoenwaelder,
			Yaron Sheffer, Meral Shirazipour, Michael Sweet, and Martin Thomson
			for feedback on this revision.
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Julian F. Reschke		Julian F. Reschke
	greenbytes GmbH		greenbytes GmbH
	Hafenweg 16		Hafenweg 16
	Muenster, NW 48155		Muenster, NW 48155
	Germany		Germany
	EMail: julian.reschke@greenbytes.de		EMail: julian.reschke@greenbytes.de
	URI: http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/		URI: http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/
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